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ARTICLE
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
REGIME: NOT BUSINESS AS USUAL
KATIA YANNACA-SMALL*
INTRODUCTION
The foreign investment promotion and protection regime, developed in
the last sixty or so years through an extensive framework of international
investment agreements (IIAs), has given foreign investors formidable ac-
cess to investor-state arbitration. This has allowed them to challenge host
government decisions and measures allegedly detrimental to their invest-
ment. The regime was almost unchallenged until a few years ago when it
came under scrutiny and criticism, inter alia, for allegedly giving dispropor-
tionate advantages to foreign investors without any corresponding legal ob-
ligations toward the host states and communities. The adoption of the U.N.
Sustainable Development Goals1 in 2015 has created a new policy climate
in which foreign investment should be protected if it is harnessed in the
service of sustainable development goals.
* Professor Katia Yannaca-Small is an independent counsel advising states and companies
on commercial and investor-state arbitration, dispute prevention, sustainable investment and inter-
national law issues, and is currently teaching international investment law and arbitration at the
University of Southern California’s Gould School of Law. Previously, she was counsel with the
International Arbitration and Public International Law Groups of Shearman and Sterling LLP in
Washington DC. Prior to joining the private sector, she was the senior legal advisor on Interna-
tional Investment with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in
Paris, in charge of all the OECD work on international investment agreements and arbitration. In
the OECD, she also held several high-profile roles on investment and trade policy, anti-corruption,
and corporate social responsibility. The results of this work have been used as reference by gov-
ernments and included in several OECD publications. Prof. Yannaca-Small also served as senior
counsel with the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), where she administered large investor-state arbitrations, and proposed and developed the
first ICSID course on ICSID procedure for government officials and practitioners. She has trained
numerous practitioners and government officials worldwide. She is a frequent speaker and has
written extensively in the field of investment arbitration and has edited and authored several chap-
ters of the one of the main treatises in the field, Arbitration Under International Investment Agree-
ments: A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2010, 2nd ed. 2018).
1. See United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, https://www.un.org/sustainablede-
velopment/sustainable-development-goals (last visited Nov. 26, 2020).
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There is little doubt that businesses can make a vital contribution to
sustainable development and inclusive growth. The activities and innova-
tions generated by multinational enterprises (MNEs) through international
trade and investment can bring valuable benefits and improve people’s
quality of life. On the other hand, the activities of some MNE investors may
have negative impacts resulting in harms. The complexity of global supply
chains can lead to an increase in human rights and labor risks, including
child labor, forced labor, and unsafe working conditions. Environmental
impacts are also significant, such as greenhouse gas emissions; excess water
use; air, land, and water pollution; and waste. Corruption is becoming more
complex and more difficult to detect and battle at the globalized scale of
MNEs’ operations.
The negative impacts can be mitigated and even avoided when MNEs
adopt socially responsible conduct. In the context of this article, corporate
social responsibility (CSR) refers to business conduct consistent with appli-
cable laws and internationally recognized standards in the areas of human
rights, international labor and environmental standards, anti-corruption,
and, more generally, in any area that promotes sustainable development. It
includes both the positive contribution businesses can make to sustainable
development as well as the avoidance of adverse impacts and addressing
them when they occur. An increasing number of MNEs are now engaged in
efforts not only to address CSR by being accountable for their behavior but
also to make these efforts measurable by adopting and enhancing “environ-
mental, social and governance” (ESG) standards.
The mounting call to provide for foreign investor responsibility and
obligations has resulted in the inclusion of such investor obligations clauses
in a number of recent IIAs, although their content and legal effect varies.
Section I will discuss the current international framework on CSR, includ-
ing the way it is addressed through soft law instruments and the second
generation of international investment agreements. This section will also
analyze new developments in this field. Section II will discuss the dispute
settlement means available to address the adverse effects of corporate be-
havior, absent specific provisions under the first generation IIAs, such as
counterclaims and due diligence requirements. Finally, in section III, with
investor-state mediation now gaining steam as an alternative method for
resolving investor-state disputes, it is useful to examine and reflect on the
procedures under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the
Guidelines), the main existing soft-law based consultation and mediation
mechanism to address business behavior, in use for decades. Such a mecha-
nism, based on a soft law instrument, may be the most efficient option cur-
rently available to manage business behavior and any conflicts between
foreign investors and the community in which they operate. Further scrutiny
and strengthening of the role of the National Contact Points (NCPs), the
government agencies operating under the mandate of the Guidelines, may
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be needed to enhance the mechanism as it currently stands. This mecha-
nism, accompanied with a due diligence requirement, as also advocated in
the context of U.N. Guiding Principles (UNGPs), at the national or interna-
tional level, and the parallel observance of this requirement by businesses,
can provide at least a partial answer to the question of securing observance
of responsible business obligations by investors.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK ON CSR: FROM THE SOFT LAW
APPROACH TO THE QUEST FOR BINDING OBLIGATIONS FOR
INVESTORS
Before any discussion of introducing provisions in IIAs to create legal
obligations for investors, efforts to address these issues at the international
level took place in the context of several international non-binding instru-
ments, such as the Guidelines2 and the 2011 UNGPs.3 These instruments
are often mentioned in new IIAs which include provisions on responsible
business behavior and investors’ obligations. Binding obligations for MNEs
are also being proposed and discussed in the context of a treaty on business
and human rights currently being negotiated under the auspices of the U.N.
Human Rights Council.4
A. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)
The Guidelines, first adopted in 1976 and revised several times since,5
are the first internationally recognized and most comprehensive standard on
CSR. They are recommendations on responsible business conduct backed
by forty-eight governments (OECD and non-OECD).6 The governments
2. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are a part of the 1976
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, a policy commit-
ment by adhering governments to provide an open and transparent environment for international
investment and to encourage the positive contribution MNEs can make to economic and social
progress. The Guidelines cover all major areas of business ethics. Their recommendations are set
out in eleven chapters and cover topics such as information disclosure, human rights, employment
and labor, environment, anti-corruption, and consumer interests. The Guidelines also encompass
three areas—science and technology, competition, and taxation—not as fully covered by any
other international corporate responsibility instrument. See Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev.
[OECD], OECD Guideline for Multinational Enterprises (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
mne/48004323.pdf.
3. Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. HR/
PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter UNGPs]; see Hum. Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
RES/17/4, ¶ 1 (July 6, 2011) (UNGPs is endorsed by the Human Rights Council).
4. Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group [OEIGWG], Revised Draft of a Legally
Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (July 16, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Docu
ments/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf.
5. The last update of the Guidelines was undertaken in 2011. See OECD, supra note 2.
6. In addition to the thirty-seven OECD member countries, the following non-member gov-
ernments adhere to the Guidelines: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
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that adhere to the Guidelines aim to encourage the positive contributions
MNEs can make to sustainable development and to minimize the difficul-
ties to which their various operations may give rise. They bring together all
thematic areas of business responsibility, including human rights and labor
rights, as well as information disclosure, environment, bribery, consumer
interests, science and technology, competition, and taxation. This compre-
hensiveness is a unique feature of the Guidelines and makes it the only
government-backed instrument covering all major sustainability risks.7
They incorporate and are aligned with the UNGP standards on business
responsibility and core International Labour Organization (ILO) workplace
standards. They provide for National Contact Points (NCPs) established by
governments to promote the Guidelines and to serve as a non-judicial griev-
ance mechanism to handle cases against companies when the Guidelines are
not observed.8 NCPs are a unique implementation mechanism and have
supported access to a remedy on a global scale by providing a platform for
mediation and conciliation. This will be further discussed in section III of
this article.
Since the latest review in 2011, the Guidelines call for enterprises to
carry out due diligence to “identify, prevent and mitigate actual and poten-
tial adverse impacts” on matters covered by the Guidelines.9 In this context,
the OECD has produced due-diligence guidance through multi-stakeholder
processes involving governments, business representatives, trade unions,
and civil society more generally. This guidance is a valuable tool for busi-
nesses seeking to understand their responsibilities and act upon them.
B. United Nations Work on Business and Human Rights
In his 2008 report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Pro-
fessor John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral for Business and Human Rights, set out a three-part framework,
“Protect, Respect and Remedy,” to advance a shared understanding of the
complex interactions between companies and human rights.10 The frame-
work, subsequently endorsed unanimously by the U.N. Human Rights
Council, comprises three elements: (i) the state duty to protect human rights
from abuse by third parties, including businesses, through appropriate poli-
Morocco, Peru, Romania, Tunisia, and Ukraine. See OECD, supra note 2. See also, OECD, PRO-
GRESS REPORT ON NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS FOR RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 2 (2019).
7. Responsible Business Conduct Thematic Areas, OECD, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/
mneguidelines (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
8. The National Contact Points were created during the 2000 revision of the OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises as means to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines. OECD,
supra note 2, at 68.
9. See OECD, supra note 2, at 20, ¶ 10.
10. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises), Protect, Respect and Rem-
edy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
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cies, regulation, and adjudication at the national level; (ii) the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights, which means to act with due dili-
gence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse
human rights impacts with which they are involved; and (iii) the need for
more effective access to remedy.11 In 2011, the UNGPs were adopted to
implement the framework.12 They do not create binding international obli-
gations for corporate actors to observe human rights. Rather, they rely on
corporate human rights risk assessment through the businesses’ internal due
diligence procedure.13
Interest in a binding treaty on business and human rights started in
2014 when the United Nations Human Rights Council established the
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights
(OEIGWG).14 The mandate of the OEIGWG is “to elaborate an interna-
tional legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights
law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enter-
prises.”15 The OEIGWG has held five sessions so far and, during its last
session in October 2019, examined a revised draft of the Legally Binding
Instrument.16 Although its successful conclusion currently seems far-
fetched given the differences among participating governments, such a
treaty could have considerable impact on international investment law and
arbitration.
11. Id.
12. H.R.C. Res. 17/4, supra note 3, ¶ 3.
13. Paragraph 17 of UNGPs states that:
In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse
human rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence.
The process should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, inte-
grating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how im-
pacts are addressed. Human rights due diligence:
(a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may
cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its
operations, products or services by its business relationships;
(b) Will vary in complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the risk of
severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of its operations;
(c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may change over
time as the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve.
Office of the High Commissioner, UNGPs, supra note 3, ¶ 17.
14. The resolution was tabled by Ecuador and South Africa and it was co-sponsored by Bo-
livia, Cuba, and Venezuela. It was strongly supported by a coalition of civil society organizations
who formed a “Treaty Alliance” but the participating governments were more divided in their
support.
15. Hum. Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, ¶ 1 (July 14, 2014).
16. See OEIGWG, supra note 4.
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C. CSR as a New Feature in Investment Treaty Making: A Slow
Balancing Act
By contrast, the reform of existing “first generation” IIAs is now a real
process. Those agreements did not address business conduct or adverse im-
pacts caused by business. The view was that these would be addressed
under domestic law, that national governments have the primary duty to
protect their people from any harm done by business, and that the main
obligation of MNEs is to comply with applicable laws in the host coun-
tries.17 However, national legal frameworks may lack laws to address abu-
sive conduct or there may be failure to enforce existing laws. This can be
due to lack of capacity, bribery, or other misconduct.
Investment policy makers have started re-examining the degree to
which the traditional primary reliance on national law is sufficient to ad-
dress business conduct, and to consider a possibly stronger contribution of
investment treaty policy in this area. The silence of many older generation
IIAs on issues like climate change, human rights, gender, the rights of in-
digenous peoples, or public health is increasingly visible and contested. The
call to include principles and provisions referring to the protection of
human rights, labor, and the environment in IIAs has been a part of the
larger efforts to rebalance the IIAs, in order to both ensure the effective
protection of investors and secure the policy space for host states to regulate
in the public interest.
Governments have begun to address business in their new trade and
investment treaties in recent years. Obligations for investors have been in-
corporated into, to name a few, the 2016 Morocco-Nigeria BIT,18 2016 Ar-
gentina-Qatar BIT,19 2016 Pan-African Investment Code (PAIC),20 2012
South African Development Community (SADC) Model Bilateral Invest-
17. Business groups repeatedly emphasized that it is the duty of governments to establish and
enforce laws and to create and maintain a stable and predictable policy environment as well as
consistent regulatory and legal frameworks. “To advance progress, all states must be encouraged
to address economic, environmental and social, including human rights challenges, in their own
jurisdictions by implementing national and international standards both at the national and local
levels.” Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], Business at OECD, at 3 (Nov. 5, 2019), http://
biac.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FIN-2019-11-COM-RBC-PoW1.pdf.
18. Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Morocco-Nigeria, Dec. 3,
2016, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/otheriia/
3711/morocco---nigeria-bit-2016- [hereinafter Morocco-Nigeria BIT].
19. The Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Arg.-Qatar, Nov. 6,
2016, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bilateral-
investment-treaties/3706/argentina [hereinafter Argentina-Qatar BIT].
20. See Afr. Union Comm’n, Draft of Pan-African Investment Code (Dec. 2016), https://
au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32844-doc-draft_pan-african_investment_code_december_
2016_en.pdf.
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ment Treaty,21 Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA),22 and 2019 Nether-
lands BIT.23
Some of these clauses are indirect clauses, framing CSR as a self-regu-
lating technique that home and host states should promote. Under the
CETA, the parties agree on:
Encouraging the development and use of voluntary best
practices of corporate social responsibility by enterprises, such as
those in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, to
strengthen coherence between economic, social and environmen-
tal objectives.24
These provisions do not change the corporate or ethical duties of com-
panies into enforceable legal obligations in the context of dispute settlement
proceedings. They merely reaffirm the voluntary nature of CSR, which re-
mains a form of self-responsibility for companies that can, at most, be en-
couraged by states.
Other, new generation IIAs (or proposed IIAs) include direct human
rights obligations on companies. The 2012 South African Development
Community (SADC) Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,25 the 2016 draft
Pan-African Investment Code (the draft PAI Code),26 and the 2016 Mo-
rocco-Nigeria BIT27 are notable examples.
Under the Nigeria-Morocco BIT, for instance, investors are subjected
to certain binding obligations. These include the maintenance of an environ-
mental management system to ISO 14001 or equivalent standard while, in
relation to labor and human rights standards:
1) Investors and investments shall uphold human rights in
the host state;
2) Investors and investments shall act in accordance with
core labor standards as required by the ILO Declaration on Fun-
damental Principles and Rights of Work, 1998; and
3) Investors and investments shall not manage or operate the
investments in a manner that circumvents international environ-
mental, labor and human rights obligations to which the host state
and/or home state are Parties.28
21. See S. Afr. Dev. Cmty., SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Com-
mentary (July 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-
Template-Final.pdf.
22. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-Eur. Union, Sept. 21, 2017,
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ [hereinafter CETA].
23. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands Model Investment Agreement (Mar. 22,
2019), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse-zaken/documenten/
publicaties/2019/03/22/nieuwe-modeltekst-investeringsakkoorden.
24. CETA, supra note 22, at ch. 22, art. 22.3(b).
25. See Southern African Development Community, supra note 21.
26. See Afr. Union Comm’n, supra note 20.
27. See Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 18.
28. Id. at 15, art. 18.
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In addition, it introduces a novel development in IIA practice stating
that:
Investors shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the
judicial process of their home state for the acts or decisions made
in relation to the investment where such acts or decisions lead to
significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the host
state.29
The new 2019 Model Netherlands BIT30 provides in its Article 7(1)
that:
Investors and their investments shall comply with domestic
laws and regulations of the host state, including laws and regula-
tions on human rights, environmental protection and labor laws.
Article 7(3) of the BIT imposes a duty on the investor to consider the
wider impact of the projected investment:
The Contracting parties reaffirm the importance of investors
conducting a due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate
and account for environmental and social risks and impacts of its
investment.31
The Model Netherlands BIT refers to and affirms the G20 Guiding
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking (Article 3(3)),32 the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change,33 the fundamental ILO Conventions,34 and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 6(6)),35 as well as in-
ternational CSR standards, including the OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business, and Human
Rights and Recommendation CM/REC(206) (Articles 7(2), (5)). Further, it
attempts to put some teeth into the obligation to adhere to these standards.
Under Article 23, a tribunal is “expected to” take into account non-compli-
ance by the investor with its commitments under the U.N. Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises.
29. Id. at 16, art. 20.
30. See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 23.
31. Id.
32. Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], Annex III: The G20 Guiding Principles for
Global Investment Policymaking, https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/G20-Guiding-
Principles-for-Global-Investment-Policymaking.pdf.
33. See Paris Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agree-
ment_english_.pdf.
34. See International Labour Organization, Conventions and Recommendations, https://
www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-
recommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2020).
35. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
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II. ARBITRATION AS A DISPUTE SETTLEMENT TOOL TO ENSURE
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS BEHAVIOR
Since the first generation of IIAs does not include language on CSR,
the number of arbitral decisions raising the responsibility of investors is
limited. Investor-state tribunals, for the most part, have been reluctant to
accommodate the application of non-investment obligations and other trea-
ties in cases in front of them. Until claims are brought under the new gener-
ation of IIAs, the respondent state and the tribunals deciding on such cases
have limited resources. Human rights and other business responsibility is-
sues may be the basis of a counterclaim on the part of the respondent state,
although the experience so far has been limited. The obligation of investors
to exercise due diligence in order to receive protection under the IIAs’ sub-
stantive investment standards may be the connecting element and has the
potential of further development. Furthermore, the investor’s conduct in the
assessment of the fair and equitable treatment standard (FET) may be an-
other option for consideration under the current limited circumstances. A
working group in the arbitration community identified that new rules
needed to be formulated, given that the current system of international arbi-
tration was not adequate in accommodating human rights issues through
aspects such as the lack of transparency and the lack of human rights arbi-
trator expertise. The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitra-
tion are a new development within the field to assist with disputes relating
to human rights and their violations.36
A. The Enforcement of Investor Obligations through Counterclaims and
the Role of Due Diligence
CSR clauses inserted in IIAs could be a useful basis for counterclaims
allowing host countries to actively hold investors liable. This is because
counterclaims allow host countries to react to the principal claims of foreign
investors and directly challenge their wrongful conduct.
Under the current circumstances, though, counterclaims have not been
very successful.37 A majority of IIAs do not contain provisions allowing
counterclaims to be invoked. Also, the counterclaim has to be within the
jurisdiction of the tribunal and arise directly from the subject matter of the
dispute and directly out of the investment. Further, there is uncertainty as to
36. The Hague & Ctr. for Int’l Legal Coop., The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights
Arbitration (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/The-Hague-
Rules-on-Business-and-Human-Rights-Arbitration_CILC-digital-version.pdf (funding for the pro-
ject was provided by the City of The Hague and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Netherlands).
37. See generally Mark A. Clodfelter & Diana Tsutieva, Counterclaims in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, in ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY
ISSUES (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2d ed. 2018).
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whether host country obligations under international law can be enforced
against foreign investors.
This was demonstrated in Urbaser v. Argentina.38 In this case, Argen-
tina filed a counterclaim regarding the investor’s breach of the human right
to water.39 The tribunal rejected the investor’s assertion that the examina-
tion of its human rights obligations was outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.40
It deemed the BIT to be worded broadly enough to afford jurisdiction over
the counterclaim, and deemed the factual connection between the claim and
the counterclaim to be “manifest” since they were based on the same invest-
ment and involved claimants’ compliance with the concession commit-
ments at issue.41
In examining the BIT’s relation to international law and human rights,
the Urbaser tribunal referred to instruments such as the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Eco-
nomic Social and Cultural Rights to recognize human rights to water and
sanitation.42 It stated that, even as these instruments recognize that people
have certain rights, they do not impose affirmative obligations on private
parties to promote or implement those rights. At most, these instruments
impose a prohibition “not to engage in activity aimed at destroying such
rights.”43
The tribunal concluded that Argentina’s claim could not be accepted
on the merits, as the human right to water created obligations for States
only.44 However, the tribunal considered that: “The situation would be dif-
ferent in case an obligation to abstain, like a prohibition to commit acts
violating human rights[,] would be at stake. Such an obligation can be of
immediate application, not only upon States, but equally to individuals and
other private parties.”45 This negative obligation recalls one of the well-
38. See Urbaser S.A., Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v.
The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 6, 2016), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0887.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Counter-
Memorial and Counter-Claim of the Argentine Republic (May 29, 2013) (not public).
40. Urbaser S.A., Award, supra note 38, ¶ 1155.
41. Id. In another case, Aven v. Costa Rica, after the tribunal accepted that counterclaims
were contemplated by the DR-CAFTA treaty and were therefore within the parties’ consent, it
found that language protecting the state’s right to regulate and enforce measures in the interest of
the environment imposed treaty obligations on investors. It concluded that, while the DR-CAFTA
did not impose any express affirmative obligation on investors to protect the ecology of the host
state, it could elevate breach of domestic environmental regulations to a treaty breach, forming the
cause of action for a counterclaim. Ultimately though, the tribunal rejected Costa Rica’s counter-
claim for environmental damage for procedural reasons. See David Aven et al. v. the Republic of
Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Final Award (Sept. 18, 2018).
42. Urbaser S.A., Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The
Argentine Republic, supra note 38, ¶¶ 1196–98.
43. Id. ¶ 1199.
44. Id. ¶ 1210.
45. Id.
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known CSR standards, the due diligence obligation requiring MNEs to “en-
deavor” not to violate human rights or pollute the environment. The human
rights due diligence conducted by companies as a part of the CSR, and most
recently the ESG discourse, has been, as mentioned above, primarily con-
ceptualized through the work of John Ruggie, the U.N. Special Representa-
tive on Business and Human Rights. According to the UNGPs, companies
have a responsibility to respect human rights. Within this responsibility,
companies have to undertake due diligence in order to identify, prevent,
mitigate, and account for how they address their adverse human rights im-
pacts. Human-rights due diligence should be understood as part of the com-
pany’s CSR/ESG framework incorporated into broader enterprise
management risk systems.46 This means that human-rights due diligence is
one of the integral elements of CSR and ESG performance whose aim is to
ensure responsible business conduct and to prevent possible human rights
violations, especially for companies operating abroad. Under international
investment law, foreign investors operating in host states are required, at
least to some extent, to assess the socio-political and economic risks that
might also include the human rights situation and the environmental issues
affecting the investment.
It could be imagined that, faced with a CSR clause in a future invest-
ment treaty requiring investors to comply with this due diligence obligation,
an arbitral tribunal could have a useful tool to consolidate an enforceable
obligation on investors with a basis for admitting counterclaims.
If investors are aware of the risk of host countries successfully bring-
ing counterclaims invoking their lack of due diligence, they might be dis-
suaded from initiating an arbitration proceeding in which they would have
to justify their own conduct. Therefore, the link between the duty of due
diligence (as described in a CSR clause) and investment law (through coun-
terclaims) could help “significantly moralize the use of treaty-based arbitra-
tion.”47 Investors could even be held liable for breaching a due-diligence
obligation that is directly enforceable and that could ultimately impose on
them an obligation to compensate the host country.
Another way to have a basis for such counterclaims would be for a
state to expressly add CSR standards to a license—a mining license, for
instance. Or, investors themselves may voluntarily include CSR standards
in documents they submit to a state to gain approval for exploration or
production. The incorporation of these standards by either party could give
rise to a counterclaim. If these CSR standards are affirmed in a license or an
internal regulation, then a state may choose to bring a counterclaim if the
46. See Hum. Rts. Council Res. 17/4, supra note 3.
47. See L. Dubin, RSE et droit des investissements, les prémisses d’une rencontre, Revue
Générale de Droit International Public, 2018, vol. 4. referring to E. Gaillard L’avenir des traités
de protection des investissements. C. Leben (Ed.), Droit international des investissements et de
l’arbitrage international, Paris, Pedone, 2015, p. 1040.
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investor fails to comply with the standards.48 On the flip-side, we may en-
visage situations where investors who conduct effective CSR due diligence
could be harbored from certain potential liabilities.
B. Investor Conduct in the Assessment of the Fair and Equitable
Treatment (FET) Standard
The requirement for an investor to conduct due diligence has been ap-
plied by investment tribunals in deciding on the protection of an investor
under substantive investment protection clauses. One of these substantive
protection provisions is the FET standard, which is one of the most com-
monly invoked provisions in investment cases.49 Almost all treaties provide
that the investor should be treated fairly and equitably by a host state. One
of the pivotal elements of the FET standard is the protection of the legiti-
mate expectations of an investor. A breach of the legitimate expectations of
an investor may lead to a violation of the FET standard. The investor’s
legitimate expectations are usually based on implicit or explicit assurances
or representations made by the host state to the investor. These can be pro-
vided to investors in different forms, for example in the state’s legislation or
through contractual commitments. In the absence of any explicit or implicit
representations by the host state towards the investor, the latter may still
have legitimate expectations, based on the expectation of the stability of the
general legal framework.
In assessing the legitimacy of expectations, a number of tribunals have
underlined the importance of the investor’s own diligent conduct for the
purpose of protecting its legitimate expectations. This is primarily related to
the risk assessment and due diligence checks that are expected to be per-
formed by an investor in order to justify its expectations. In several deci-
sions, tribunals have emphasized that an investor, before claiming the
protection of its legitimate expectations, has to assess the possible risks and
to perform a due-diligence check before investing in a host state. For exam-
ple, the investment tribunal in Biwater v. Tanzania stressed that “counter-
vailing factors such as the responsibility of foreign investors, both in terms
of prior due diligence as well as subsequent conduct” should be considered
in establishing the violation.50 On the part of an investor, the performance
of a due-diligence test and risk assessment may include the collection of
information on the rules and regulations concerning the investor’s invest-
ment. Also, in a number of FET decisions, tribunals have emphasized that
48. See Yasmine Lahlou et al., The Rise of Environmental Counterclaims in Mining Arbitra-
tion, in THE GUIDE TO MINING ARBITRATIONS 51–68 (Jason Fry & Louis-Alexis Bret eds., 2019).
49. See generally Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Have Its Contours
Fully Evolved?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO
THE KEY ISSUES (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2018).
50. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
22, Final Award, ¶ 601 (July 24, 2008).
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an investor should take into account the economic and sociopolitical back-
ground in the host state.51 The level of preparation by the investor is ex-
pressed in the extent of the due diligence and risk assessment conducted by
the investor.
C. The Hague Arbitration Rules on Business and Human Rights
The Hague Arbitration Rules on Business and Human Rights (The
Hague Arbitration Rules)52 were initiated by the Business and Human
Rights Arbitration Working Group, a private group of international practic-
ing lawyers and academics. They aim to create an international private judi-
cial dispute resolution avenue available to parties involved in business and
human rights issues.
The Hague Arbitration Rules are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules. In contrast to investment treaty arbitration, they are not:
[L]imited by the type of claimant(s) or respondent(s) or the sub-
ject-matter of the dispute and extend to any disputes that the par-
ties to an arbitration agreement have agreed to resolve by
arbitration under the Hague Rules. Parties could thus include bus-
iness entities, individuals, labor unions and organizations, States,
State entities, international organizations and civil society organi-
zations, as well as any other parties of any kind.53
There is an emphasis on public interest considerations and access to
justice. The Hague Arbitration Rules seek to contribute in “filling the judi-
cial remedy gap in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights.”54 “Human rights disputes” in this context mean:
1. The Victim-Business scenario: the typical scenario in which
“victims” bring claims against a company alleging that their
human rights have been impacted by the activities of that
company
2. The Business-Business scenario: with the growth of obliga-
tions to monitor and conduct due diligence down a business’
supply chain, for example where a manufacturer imposes ob-
ligations on a contractor or supplier to comply with certain
human rights standards in the performance of its obligations
and that contractor or supplier breaches those obligations55
51. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01.7, Award, ¶ 178 (May 25, 2004); Parkering-Companiet AS v. Republic of Lithuania,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 332–33 (Sept. 11, 2007).
52. See The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration, supra note 36.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Julianne Hughes-Jennett, Energy Disputes in a Disruptive World – A Take on Business
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It remains to be seen whether the Hague Arbitration Rules will help
address the “investor obligation deficit” in current IIAs and whether the
ethos of the Rules may indirectly pave the way towards a new generation of
IIAs, by having elaborated on the standing of human rights considerations
in this context.
III. CSR THROUGH DUE DILIGENCE, MEDIATION AND CONSULTATION:
THE MECHANISM OF THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
State-based mechanisms are emphasized as an essential part of the
state duty to protect human rights. Company-level mechanisms are seen as
crucial to the ability of companies to fulfill their responsibility to respect
rights. Due diligence mechanisms are developed by businesses to achieve
and demonstrate compliance.
With regard to the third pillar of the framework on access to remedy,
Ruggie reflected in both his 2008 and 2009 reports on the respective roles
of judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms. Ruggie posits that non-
judiciary mechanisms—including those based on the mediation of dis-
putes—have an important role to play alongside judicial processes in pro-
viding remedy for human rights abuses by companies.56 Soft law
mechanisms, such as those in the context of the OECD Guidelines, have
been used for a long time with, until recently, mixed results. However, this
mechanism, which is already in place and has been tried, can provide for
notification, mediation, and consultation. With improvements, it could be
an answer to remedy for human rights-related and other abuses by
companies.
A. Due Diligence: The Role of Business Compliance
Ruggie, through the UNGPs, insisted on the importance of methods to
help companies comply with their responsibilities, and to evaluate and
demonstrate compliance. The basic principle is that companies should de-
velop and implement systems so that they can both “know and show” that
they respect human rights and CSR. This led to the development of human
rights due diligence.
The OECD has taken a leading role in developing and operationalizing
CSR and human rights due diligence in multi-stakeholder processes.57 It has
produced, consolidated, and detailed due diligence guidance through multi-
stakeholder processes involving governments, business, trade unions, civil
society, and experts. OECD sectoral due-diligence guidance has also been
56. See Ruggie, supra note 10, ¶¶ 92–99.
57. See Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Respon-
sible Business Conduct, at 3 (2018), http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Gui-
dance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf.
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incorporated into regional and national legislation and rulemaking. General
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for responsible business conduct across the
full economy was adopted in 2018.58 Such broadly applicable guidance may
be of particular interest with relation to investment treaties that cover all
economic sectors.59
National and regional law developments have sought, and are seeking,
to advance CSR in international business, including through use of the
OECD due diligence framework. Efforts to advance human rights and CSR
have given rise to intensive policy debates, legislation, corporate action to
engage in due diligence, and disclosure at both the national and interna-
tional levels. Several OECD countries have introduced or are contemplating
introducing into their laws various forms of due-diligence requirements.60
The European Union is currently exploring the possibility of enacting a
standard of its own.61 The OECD due diligence framework has been at the
forefront of all these initiatives.
There have also been many voluntary initiatives by business groups, as
well as those prompted by legislative developments or investor pressure.62
58. Id.
59. A list of guidelines can be viewed by sector on the OECD’s website. See Responsible
Business Conduct, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://mneguide
lines.oecd.org/sectors (last visited Apr. 3, 2021).
60. France passed the law on the duty of vigilance of parent companies and commissioning
enterprises in 2017. French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law (English Translation), RESPECT
INT’L (Nov. 29, 2016), https://respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ngo-translation-
french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law.pdf. In Switzerland, intensive debates took place over a
proposal to introduce mandatory due diligence for companies; a national referendum on the intro-
duction of the Responsible Business Initiative was held in November 2020. Swiss Government
Opposes Responsible Business Initiative Campaign, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2020), https://
www.reuters.com/article/swiss-companies/swiss-government-opposes-responsible-business-initia-
tive-campaign-idUSL8N2GX1HY. In Finland, the government announced plans to prepare a re-
port with the objective of enacting a corporate social responsibility (CSR) act based on a duty of
care imposed on companies regarding their operations in Finland and abroad. MINISTRY OF ECON.
AFF. AND EMP. OF FIN., JUDICIAL ANALYSIS ON THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/162411/TEM_
2020_44.pdf.
61. On April 29, 2020, the European Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, announced
that the European Union plans to develop a legislative proposal by 2021 requiring businesses to
carry out due diligence in relation to the potential human rights and environmental impacts of their
operations and supply chains. He further indicated that the draft law, once developed, is likely to
be cross-sectoral and provide for sanctions in the event of non-compliance. Commissioner Reyn-
ders Announces EU Corporate Due Diligence Legislation, EUROPEAN COAL. FOR CORP. JUST.
(Apr. 30, 2020), https://corporatejustice.org/news/16806-commissioner-reynders-announces-eu-
corporate-due-diligence-legislation. On January 27, 2021, the European Parliament’s legal com-
mittee adopted a draft report containing a proposal for a directive on Corporate Due Diligence and
Corporate Accountability (the “draft directive”), calling on the European Union to legally require
companies to protect human rights and the environment in their supply chains. The draft directive
is scheduled to be discussed in the Plenary of the European Parliament on March 8, 2021.
62. In April 2020, 101 institutional investors representing over $4 trillion in assets under
management called for governments to introduce mandatory human rights due diligence laws.
INVESTOR ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INVESTOR CASE FOR MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS
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Environmental, social, and governance factors have become major consid-
erations in investment decisions for asset owners and managers despite a
lack of universally agreed standards.
B. OECD National Contact Points
The UNGPs underline that, as part of their duty to protect under inter-
national human rights law, governments are required to provide access to
remedy—to take steps to investigate, punish, and redress corporate-related
abuse of the rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction.63
Ruggie underlines that without access to remedy through these steps, the
duty to protect could be rendered weak or even meaningless. For states,
these steps to provide for remedies may be taken through judicial, adminis-
trative, legislative, or other means. Judicial systems in the host country
where the harms occur can provide remedies to victims. But access to reme-
dies is not always easy and is problematic for the implementation of the
CSR framework due to governance gaps.
Non-judicial mechanisms, Ruggie observes, whether administered by
the state or other actors, should conform to a minimum set of process prin-
ciples, summarized as legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, rights-com-
patibility, equitability, and transparency.64 With this understanding, Ruggie
posits that non-judicial mechanisms—including those based on mediation
of disputes—have an important role to play alongside judicial processes in
providing remedy for human rights-related abuses by companies.65 Rug-
gie’s conclusion is significant given the contrasting focus of much public
discourse on adjudication—and particularly judicial processes—as the pre-
ferred, if not essential, means to achieve remedy and justice when human
rights are at issue.
State-based non-judicial systems include both national and interna-
tional mechanisms. The OECD National Contact Points (NCPs) are a
unique, leading international grievance and implementation mechanism on
responsible business conduct that has supported access to remedy on a
global scale by providing a platform for mediation and conciliation.66 While
States have flexibility in how they organize their NCP, the 2011 Guidelines
state that such arrangements must allow NCPs to “operate in accordance
DUE DILIGENCE (Apr. 2020), https://investorsforhumanrights.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
2020-04/The%20Investor%20Case%20for%20mHRDD%20-%20FINAL_0.pdf.
63. See Hum. Rts. Council Res. 17/4, supra note 3; Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Frame-
work for Business and Human Rights, supra note 10.
64. Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, supra note
10, ¶ 92.
65. Id. at ¶¶ 93–95.
66. Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], Cases Handled by the National Contact Points
for Responsible Business Conduct, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Flyer-OECD-National-Contact-
Points.pdf [hereinafter National Contact Point Cases].
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST209.txt unknown Seq: 17  8-JUN-21 9:47
418 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
with core criteria of visibility, accessibility, transparency and accountability
to further the objective of functional equivalence.”67
The NCPs handle complaints, known as “specific instances.” They
have broad potential reach in terms of complainants and covered companies
in these specific instances. Since the 2000 update of the Guidelines, any
entity—an individual, organization, or community—may allege that a com-
pany has not observed the OECD Guidelines and may submit a formal re-
quest to an NCP.68 NCPs are not judicial bodies and specific instances are
not legal cases. NCPs contribute to the resolution of complaints and the
process is voluntary. An NCP cannot compel parties to participate in the
resolution of issues, impose sanctions, or order compensation, absent a gov-
ernment mandate. The Guidelines call on enterprises to remedy impacts
they caused or contributed to: “[a]void causing or contributing to adverse
impacts on matters covered by the Guidelines, through their own activities,
and address such impacts when they occur.”69 Furthermore, they provide
that “[p]otential impacts are to be addressed through prevention or mitiga-
tion, while actual impacts are to be addressed through remediation.”70 As
such, remediation is central to both the purposes and effectiveness of the
Guidelines. While NCPs cannot compel specific actions or award compen-
sation, they can play an important role facilitating remedy discussions
amongst parties, thereby potentially contributing to the resolutions of the
issues.71
Identifying different ways in which NCPs can use informal problem-
solving methods in specific instances and improving mediation skills have
been identified as high priority for NCPs following the 2011 update of the
Guidelines. NCPs of the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom
have sponsored a Mediation Manual by the Consensus Building Institute
67. For instance, in 2014, the Dutch NCP was mandated by the government to conduct cross-
sector investigations. In October 2016, the government requested that the NCP investigate compli-
ance with the OECD Guidelines by the Dutch oil and gas sector. In January 2019, the NCP
delivered the results of the investigation to the government, concluding that implementation of the
OECD Guidelines is poor, and transparency is insufficient across the oil and gas sector. This is the
first time that an NCP was asked to conduct research on a specific sector and give findings on the
matter. Denmark’s NCP, the Mediation and Complaints Handling Institution for Responsible Bus-
iness Conduct (MKI), is established by law and is mandated to consider cases concerning non-
compliance with the OECD Guidelines of both private and public organizations. The Norwegian
NCP is established as an independent expert advisory body and comprises four independent ex-
perts. Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at
71, annex (May 25, 2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
68. National Contact Point Cases, supra note 66.
69. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 67, at 20, ¶ 11.
70. Id. at 23, ¶ 14.
71. Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], Guide for National Contact Points on the Initial
Assessment of Specific Instances, at 13 (2019), http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Guide-for-National-
Contact-Points-on-the-Initial-Assessment-of-Specific-Instances.pdf.
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that clarifies whether, when, and how NCPs could use mediation and other
informal problem-solving methods to resolve claims in specific instances.72
Indeed, various specific instances have been concluded in which NCPs
have facilitated the provision of remedy to a submitter by an enterprise.
There have been roughly thirty specific instances submitted annually to
NCPs since the 2011 last update of the Guidelines, for a total of over 500.73
There was a record fifty-two new submissions brought to NCPs in 2018.
Human rights are the fastest growing basis for claims—accounting for over
half of the cases since 2011 (57 percent) as opposed to only 4 percent prior
to 2011, followed by expectations related to due diligence, employment and
worker issues, and environment. Most cases are brought by trade unions
and NGOs (40 and 38 percent, respectively).74 Individuals, including parlia-
mentarians, have brought a number of cases. A company has also brought a
case against another company. The financial sector has grown to be a lead-
ing sector for specific instances submissions in recent years. NCPs are re-
quired to issue a final statement upon concluding a specific instance
process. Some NCPs also make determinations, setting out their own views
on whether a company observed the OECD Guidelines or not. This is not
required by the OECD Guidelines but is a growing practice.
Provisions for monitoring and follow-up were included in 78 percent
of the final statements issued in 2018. In a few cases, agreements reached
among parties have included direct remedy for the complainants.75 Between
2011 and 2019 over a third of all cases which were accepted for further
examination by NCPs (36 percent) resulted in some form of agreement be-
tween the parties while approximately 33 percent resulted in an internal
policy change by the company in question to mitigate impacts.76
During the 2011 revision of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs, it was
agreed that NCPs will engage in peer learning activities and are encouraged
to carry out voluntary peer review. Following sharp criticism by OECD
Watch about the results achieved by NCPs in the field of CSR including
72. CONSENSUS BLDG. INST., NCP MEDIATION MANUAL (rev. July 2012), https://
www.responsiblebusiness.no/ansvarlignaringsliv-no/files/2015/10/NCP_mediation_manual.pdf.
73. See Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, Progress Report on National
Contact Points for Responsible Business Conduct (May 22–23, 2019), http://www.oecd.org/mcm/
documents/NCPs%20-%20CMIN(2019)7%20-%20EN.pdf [hereinafter the Progress Report]; Na-
tional Contact Point Cases, supra note 66.
74. National Contact Point Cases, supra note 66.
75. For example, a specific instance filed at the Dutch NCP involving former employees of
Bralima (a subsidiary of Heineken) resulted in financial compensation to 168 employees, a rem-
edy they had been seeking for nearly seventeen years, and changes to Heineken’s human rights
due-diligence policy. However, such remedies remain rare. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Final
Statement Specific Instance Former Employees Bralima vs. Bralima and Heineken (Aug. 18,
2017).
76. National Contact Point Cases, supra note 66.
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human rights violations by companies,77 OECD members committed them-
selves in June 2017 to peer review all NCPs by 2023.78 To date, twenty-
three governments have either completed or committed to a peer review.79
Peer reviews completed to date have highlighted a range of challenges
faced by NCPs. These challenges range from insufficient allocation of re-
sources with just twenty-six NCPs having at least one full-time staff mem-
ber, through to challenges concerning NCP location and structures and an
increased complexity of cases being handled by NCPs. In order for the en-
tire community of NCPs to meet the expectations set out by their mandate,
appropriate government support, resources, and institutional arrangements
are required so that their work can be carried out in a way that demonstrates
the full potential of these unique agencies for responsible business
conduct.80
The functioning of the NCPs needs improvement, as has been high-
lighted by NGOs and recognized by the OECD governments and the wider
membership of the Guidelines. The impact of this mechanism would be
enhanced by strengthened support from participating governments and
wider awareness of this mechanism by all appropriate constituencies. There
is, nevertheless, no doubt that this long-tested, constantly evolving, flexible,
non-judicial mechanism, which includes mediation and conciliation, is a
promising avenue for the observance of responsible business practices and
CSR through the application of the soft law instrument of the OECD
Guidelines.
CONCLUSION
The increasing criticism of the legitimacy of the system of investor-
state arbitration has brought the issue of corporate social responsibility of
foreign investors into the frontline of international investment law. The cur-
rent international investment law regime, through its network of IIAs, is ill-
equipped to respond to calls for holding investors accountable for poten-
tially harmful behavior related to human rights, labor risks, environmental
77. In its 2015 report, Remedy Remains Rare, OECD Watch highlighted that “the over-
whelming majority of complaints (brought before NCPs) have failed to bring an end to corporate
misconduct or provide remedy for past or on-going abuses, leaving complainants in the same or
worse position as they were in before they filed their complaint” and noted that many NCPs failed
to respect the procedural guidance set forward in the OECD Guidelines. OECD Watch’s plan for
why and how to unlock the potential of the OECD Guidelines, identifies ten key reforms needed
to strengthen most NCPs’ performance. Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev. [OECD], A “4x10” Plan
for Why and How to Unlock the Potential of the OECD Guidelines (Nov. 1, 2008), https://
www.oecdwatch.org/a-4x10-plan-for-why-and-how-to-unlock-the-potential-of-the-oecd-
guidelines.
78. During a peer review, the Secretariat and representatives of two to four different NCPs
assess whether the NCP is functioning in a visible, accessible, and transparent manner. See the
Progress Report, supra note 73, at 12.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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impacts, or corruption. Some new generation IIAs try to rebalance, in order
to both ensure the effective protection of investors and to secure and en-
large the policy space for host states to regulate in the public interest, by
holding these investors accountable in various degrees. Attempts to create a
binding instrument on business and human rights are well underway, but
differences among participating governments currently make this a far-
fetched endeavor. At this time, investor-state arbitral tribunals have limited
tools to delve into claims related to investors’ responsibilities, given the
limitations of counterclaims. In light of this, the mechanism established
under the soft law OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises through
mediation and consultation as provided by its National Contact Points may
be the best option currently available to manage conflicts between foreign
investors and the community in which they operate. Accompanied by the
application of due diligence requirements, as also advocated in the context
of UNGPs, the observance of this requirement by businesses can provide
the best current answer to the question of securing observance of CSR obli-
gations by investors.
